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THE ROLE OF PLEA NEGOTIATION IN MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW
The basic principle of American criminal jurisprudence is that every
individual is entitled to a fair and impartial trial in a competent court of
law. It is from this principle that an accused party is assured protection of
his constitutional rights. Idealistically, this is the manner in which every
criminal case is handled. Realistically, however, the majority of criminal
convictions are obtained by admission of guilt. Of these admissions, a large
percentage are the result of plea negotiation.
In Cook County, the total number of defendants in felony cases in
1967 was 4,486.1 Only 16% of these Cook County prosecutions involved
actual trials. Thus, 84% of all the felony cases were disposed of without
resort to the available trial procedure. 2 This percentage reflects the prevalence of plea negotiation in the current criminal system.
While the above figures do illustrate the prevalence of plea negotiation, they fail to accurately illustrate the complexity of criminal practice.
Dismissals account for approximately 32% of the total disposition of cases.3
In the remaining cases which do not proceed to trial, pleas of guilty are
entered, either with or without negotiation. It has been estimated that between 70 and 80% of these guilty pleas have been negotiated. 4 Of those
defendants finally convicted, therefore, 63% negotiated the plea.5 It is thus
apparent that plea negotiation not only enters into a large number of
criminal felony cases, but also accounts for the majority of all felony convictions in Cook County.
Probably the main reason for the development of plea negotiation is
the large criminal caseload. "In many cities, the criminal caseload has
doubled within the past decade, while the size of the criminal bench has
remained constant." Cook County is no exception to this trend. Recent
estimates indicate that each Cook County state's attorney in the criminal
division handles at least eight to fifteen cases per day.7 This volume necessitates disposition without going to trial.
1 1967 Annual Report to the Supreme Court of Illinois 55 as prepared by the Ad-

ministrative Office of the Illinois Courts.

2 Supra note 1. It must be noted that this percentage includes all dismissals which
may or may not have been the product of plea negotiations. Also, there are some guilty
pleas entered without any plea discussions.
3 Supra note 1. In 1967 Cook County had 4,486 cases of which 1,450 were dismissed.
4 Interview with James Stamos, Assistant Cook County State's Attorney, in Chicago,
Illinois, Oct. 9, 1968.
5 Supra note 1.
6 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 51

(1968).
7 Supra note 4. Also to be considered are the limitations placed upon prosecution by
the limited number of prosecutors and defense lawyers as well as courtroom facilities and
court officials.
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Another factor which necessitates resort to plea negotiation is the weakness of the prosecutor's case.8 Proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a
time consuming burden, often impossible to meet. Generally, the strength
of the State's case is directly related to the time available for preparation.
The offer of a lesser included offense in return for an admission of guilt is
a practical way to insure punishment. As a result, the prosecutor is often
pressured into offering sentence concessions.
On the other hand, pressures evolve from this atmosphere which induce
the defendant to accept the plea. The caseload and the shortage of court
personnel not only affect the prosecutor, but also the defendant. A large
percentage of the criminal cases today are handled by public defenders. The
lack of adequate time to prepare a proper defense may justifiably cause the
defendant to fear a stiffer sentence if he goes to trial. This fear may also
arise from a lack of knowledge of the strength of the State's case. 9 In addition, a defendant with a prior criminal record may fear that his presumption of innocence will be ignored. 10 The mere appearance of a courtroom,
even without a consideration of the consequences, may induce a defendant
to admit guilt in order to avoid subjection to trial procedure."l These
pressures, when viewed as a whole, create the atmosphere out of which the
practice of plea negotiation has developed.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS OF PLEA NEGOTIATION

Arising from these pressures is the problem of whether a guilty plea
was entered voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences. It is
in this area that most of the litigation concerning the practice of plea
12
negotiation has evolved.
Generally, the courts will consider a plea of guilty, entered in due
course, as voluntary unless it appears that the defendant failed to comprehend the consequences or that he was coerced. Mere disappointment in
the sentence will not be ground for reversal. In the case of People v.
Walston,13 the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery and
was sentenced to three to ten years imprisonment. He originally pleaded
not guilty, but changed his plea when his motion to suppress evidence was
8 Supra note 4.
9 Interview with John Castle, former Assistant Cook County State's Attorney, in

DeKalb, Illinois, Nov. 6, 1968.
10 Interview with Robert Bailey, Chicago defense attorney, in Chicago, Illinois, Nov.
4, 1968.
11 Ibid.
12 See People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968); People v. Brown, 41
Ill. 2d 230, 242 N.E.2d 242 (1968); People v. Walston, 38 Ill. 2d 39, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967);
People v. Milani, 34 11. 2d 524, 216 N.E.2d 816 (1966); People v. Schmidt, 10 Ill. 2d 221,
139 N.E.2d 726 (1957); People v. Heirens, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954); People v.
Ross, 409 Ill. 599, 100 N.E.2d 923 (1951); People v. Gaston, 85 Ill. App. 2d 403, 229 N.E.2d
404 (1st Dist. 1967).
13 38 Ill. 2d 39, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967).
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denied. When the defendant heard the prosecutor's recommendation of
eight to twelve years, he asked to withdraw his plea because he had thought
he would only receive probation. The Illinois Supreme Court, citing
People v. Morreale,14 stated that:
Permission to withdraw a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not
guilty is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, yet it is
a judicial discretion which should always be exercised in favor of
innocence. . . . Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentation by counsel or the State's Attorney or
someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt
of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense
worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice
will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court
should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and allow the
accused to plead not guilty .... The mere fact, on the other hand,
that an accused, knowing his rights and the consequences of his
act, hopes and believes that he will receive a shorter sentence or
milder punishment by pleading guilty than he would upon a trial
and conviction by a jury, presents no ground for permitting the
withdrawal of15the plea after he finds that his expectation has not
been realized.
The case was reversed and remanded, however, because of error in failure
to permit the defense counsel's testimony as to exactly why the plea was
withdrawn. This decision supports the American Bar Association's suggestion that ". . . the court should allow the defendant to withdraw his
plea of guilty ...whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice."16
In line with the reasoning of the American Bar Association is the case
of People v. Riebe. 17 The defendant pleaded guilty to murder subsequent
to a conference between his defense counsel, the prosecutor and the judge.
It appears that an agreement was reached whereby the defendant was to
receive a sentence of not less than twenty-five nor more than forty years in
return for the plea of guilty. The prosecutor then recommended the sentence of not less than thirty nor more than forty-five years. Concurring
with this recommendation, the judge so sentenced the defendant. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, it was held that fairness required that
the defendant be informed of the conviction and remanded the cause on
the ground that the defendant should have been afforded the opportunity
14 412 Ill.
528, 531-2, 107 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1953). See also People v. Grabawski, 12
Ill. 2d 462, 147 N.E.2d 49 (1958); People v. Temple, 2 Ill.
2d 266, 118 N.E.2d 271 (1954).
15 Supra note 13, at 42, 230 N.E.2d at 234-5.
16 American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 2.1, at 9 (Tent.
Draft 1967).
17 40 I1. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).
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to withdraw his plea. 18 Although this case seems to conflict with People v.
Walston' 9 a distinction exists in the fact that here there was a plea agreement, participated in by the judge, whereas there, apparently no agreement
was made at all. "An unfulfilled promise by the trial judge is ordinarily
grounds for reversal by the appellate court, but an unfulfilled promise by
a prosecuting attorney has not always been treated in the same way."'20
Evidently, therefore, in the absence of participation by the judge, a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement has no absolute
guarantee that he will receive the sentence for which he bargained.
The question of coercion is the other factor in determining whether a
plea is voluntarily made. The coercion necessary to negate a plea of guilty
is that which is caused by ". . . threats or promises of illegitimate action
by law enforcement officials." 21 In the case of People v. Darrah,22 the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary. During the course of the trial, the
defense counsel was informed by the judge that a "considerably greater"
sentence would be imposed if the case went to the jury. It was not clear
whether this discussion took place before or after the plea of guilty was
entered. On appeal of the conviction and sentence, the defendant contended
that the pressures stemming from the fear of a more severe sentence
amounted to coercion. The court held that the plea of guilty was not
coerced because the defendant failed to prove that the alleged coercion occurred before he entered the plea. 28 The coercion must, therefore, be the
proximate inducement for the plea of guilty.
Another illustration of this problem is found in the case of People v.
Gaston.24 The defendant was charged with three counts of armed robbery
and one count of assault with the intent to commit robbery. He pleaded not
guilty to one of the armed robbery charges but the jury returned a verdict
against him. After this, the trial judge commented that the defendant
".. . should have come in and pled guilty. This man is a professional
robber.. . ." Following this statement, the defendant pleaded guilty to the
remaining charges. On appeal, the defendant contended, inter alia, that
this comment by the trial judge coerced him into pleading guilty. The
Appellate Court for the First District did not agree, and the convictions
were aflirmed.2 5 It is obvious, therefore, that while there are numerous pressures which may strongly influence the defendant, the required degree of
coercion is seldom found.
18 Ibid.

19 People v. Walston, 38 111. 2d 39, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967).
20 Newman, Conviction, The Determination of Guilt Or Innocence Without Trial
37 (1966).
21 People v. Bowman, 40 I1. 2d 116, 239 N.E.2d 433, 439 (1968).
22 33 Ill. 2d 175, 210 N.E.2d 478 (1965).
28 Ibid.
24 85 I11. App. 2d 403, 229 N.E.2d 404 (Ist Dist. 1967).
25 Ibid.
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Finally, a related issue may exist involving communication of the
offer from the prosecutor to the defendant. The general practice in plea
negotiation is that the discussions take place between the proscutor and
the defense counsel, without direct participation by the defendant. 26 The
defendant's absence may affect his decision regarding the plea. The defendant's knowledge of the plea offer is limited to what his defense counsel
tells him. In the case of People v. Whitfield,27 an offer to reduce a charge
from murder to manslaughter with the recommendation of probation was
made to the defendant's counsel. This offer was not communicated to the
defendant because the defense counsel thought he could win the case. The
defendant was found guilty of murder. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed and stated that:
It follows logically that if a defendant has the right to make a decision to plead not guilty, he also has the right to make the decision
to plead guilty. Due process demands this protection. It was his
choice, not that of his counsel .... 28
While this opinion clearly establishes the right of the defendant to make
the final decision, it does not erase the possibility of influence exerted by
the defense counsel in communicating the offer. The defendant may therefore become the victim of the attorney seeking trial experience, or conversely, the one who finds it more convenient not to go to trial. 29
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES

OF PLEA NEGOTIATION

The main value of the use of plea negotiation, as previously mentioned, is that it allows the prompt disposition of today's large volume of
cases. It has been argued that, "It is . . . not an exaggeration to say that
criminal procedure would totally break down, at least for a time in Cook
County, if we were to eliminate plea negotiations at this juncture of
judicial history."30 This creature of necessity, therefore, even with all its
inherent shortcomings, has become institutionalized as a major part of today's criminal practice.
Incidental to the main value of efficiency, the use of plea negotiation
in certain cases may be beneficial to the parties involved. The American
Bar Association, in its Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty, stated that:
In some cases there may be good reason for avoiding a public
trial. This is particularly true in rape and indecent liberties cases,
26 Interview with James Stamos, Assistant Cook County State's Attorney, in Chicago,
Illinois, Oct. 9, 1968.
27 40 Il1. 2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 850 (1968).
28 Id. at 311, 239 N.E.2d at 852.
29 Lecture by John Cleary, Chicago defense attorney, on Plea Bargaining.
30 From the reply brief for the defense in People v. Whitfield, 40 Ill. 2d 308, 239
N.E.2d 850 (1968).
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where the victim would have to appear in court and repeat the
details of what transpired. Testifying in public these kinds of
criminal cases is not only humiliating but may be a severely traumatic experience for the victim, especially for a child. Similarly,
in other cases publicity concerning the victim's involvement with
the offender would be unduly harmful to him. In cases of this
kind, it would seeem most appropriate to grant charge or sentence
concessions to the defendant who by his plea protects the interests
of the victim. This is currently the practice of many courts. 81
As a benefit to the prosecution, and consequently to the public, plea
negotiation may enable the prosecutor to bargain for information which
may lead to the conviction of others engaged in equally serious or more
serious criminal conduct. The American Bar Association considers this
factor important in the final disposition of a criminal case. 82 Illustrative
of the sentiment toward informants is the statement by Judge Kaufman in
United States v. Rosenberg.38
The fact that I am about to show you some consideration does not
mean that I condone your acts or that I minimize them in any
respect. They were loathsome; they were comtemptible. I must,
however, recognize the help given by you in apprehending and
bringing to justice the arch criminals in this nefarious scheme....
You confessed and told a complete story in this case and it has
been of great assistance to the Government. . . . [I]t is obvious
that the Government gave due consideration to your assistance in
their recommendation. I have to be realistic in a situation such as
this, and I recognize that despite my own inclination to be more
severe on your sentence, due to the revolting nature of this offense,
I must subordinate my own feeling. Our national security is more
important than any personal feeling that I might have on the
subject, and it is indeed more important, I think, than punish4
ment of any single individual. ..
The disposition of pending cases, therefore, is not the sole motive for plea
negotiation.
The final significant advantage of plea negotiation is the psychological
effect of any admission of guilt as a step toward rehabilitation. 5 While this
view is theoretical, and certainly open to argument, the general opinion
appears to be that:

[A]n . . . alternative to punishment is a confession, in which the
culprit avows his guilty thoughts or acts, suffering in the process
31 American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8, at 47-8
(Tent. Draft 1967).
32 Supra note 3, § 1.8(v), at 9. Listed as a factor in determining sentence concessions
is the fact that cooperation by a defendant may lead to the successful prosecution of
others engaged in similar or even more serious criminal conduct.
33 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
34 Id. at 606, n.28.
35 Interview with John Castle, former Assistant Cook County State's Attorney, in
DeKalb, Illinois, Nov. 6, 1968.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

self-reproach or reproach from the moral authorities to whom he
confesses. Almost all of us can testify from personal experience to
the relief of guilt that may follow confession, and our criminal
procedure shows that we regard confession as in some degree a
substitute for punishment, by passing a lighter sentence on those
who have freely acknowledged their guilt or who have spontaneously delivered themselves into the hands of justice. Confession is
indeed the mildest way of satisfying the need for punishment, and
increasing weight is attached to it by both the individual and by
society as moral development proceeds. 88
Acceptance of this view is evidenced by its adoption by various courts and
authorities.8 7 There is some support, however, for the contrary position,
i.e., "... . the very fact that a defendant realizes a guilty plea may mitigate
punishment impairs the value of the plea. . . ."88 In reality, an overall
adoption of either view is impractical. The rehabilitative effect on each
defendant should be considered only on an individual basis.
CONCLUSION

Plea negotiation is a by-product of today's overburdened criminal law
system. The plea of guilty in lieu of trial has become the general practice,
not only in the criminal courts of Cook County, but in the entire American
system of criminal justice. 89 The inherent problems emanating from plea
negotiation often cause detriment to the defendant. The advantages that
arise from the employment of this practice are based mainly on its necessity. From this viewpoint of practical necessity, any argument for abolition
of the practice fails. Theoretically, however, the development of plea
negotiation within the system diminishes resort to the impartial trial in a
competent court of law. This practice takes justice from the courts and puts
it into private negotiations. 40 Years out of a man's life are often bargained
for by overburdened prosecutors and underpaid defense counsels. The result
is a form of "meter justice- 4 1 which plays an ever increasing role in the
modern system of criminal law.
FRANK V. ARIANO
JOHN W.
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86 Fugel, Man, Morals and Society 148 (1945).
87 See, eg., American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8,

at 37-47 (Tent. Draft 1967); Goodhart, English Law and Moral Law 92-93 (1953); Newman,
Conviction, The Determination of Guilt Or Innocence Without Trial 95-96 (1966).
88 Comment, 66 Yale L.J. 204, 210 (1956).
89 From a brief for defense in People v. Whitfield, 40 Ill. 2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 850
(1968).
40 Lecture by John Cleary, Chicago defense attorney, on Plea Bargaining.
41 Ibid.

